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Abstract
Since the late 1980s, scholars have highlighted the role of 
diverse conceptualizations of power in explaining the func-
tioning of the global refugee regime. Part of this literature 
has examined the functioning of power in global contexts, 
while another part has explored expressions and experiences 
of power in local contexts. While these approaches illustrate 
how power may be expressed and experienced in the diverse 
contexts of the regime, can we conceptualize power in a way 
that engages with the functioning of the refugee regime in 
both global and local contexts? Can a more disaggregated 
understanding of power, sensitive to form and context of 
expression, open new areas of enquiry into the functioning 
of the regime and help explain its ability and inability to ful-
fill its core mandate of protection and solutions for refugees? 
In response, this article draws on the literature on power 
in global governance to propose a heuristic framework for 
understanding power and influence in the diverse context 
of the global refugee regime. It argues that various forms of 
power co-exist within the regime, and that further research 
could usefully examine the manifestations and implications 
of these forms of power through the making and implemen-
tation of global refugee policy.
Résumé
Depuis la fin des années 80, les universitaires soulignent le 
rôle des diverses conceptions du pouvoir dans le fonction-
nement du régime international des réfugiés. Une partie de 
la littérature examine le fonctionnement du pouvoir dans 
des contextes internationaux, une autre les formes et les 
pratiques de pouvoir dans des contextes locaux. Tandis que 
ces approches illustrent comment le pouvoir peut s’exprimer 
et être vécu dans divers contextes du régime des réfugiés, 
pouvons-nous conceptualiser le pouvoir d’une manière qui 
fasse un lien avec le fonctionnement du régime des réfugiés 
dans les contextes locaux et internationaux? Est-ce qu’une 
approche plus fragmentée du pouvoir, sensible à la forme 
et au contexte de son expression, ouvrirait de nouveaux 
champs de recherche sur le fonctionnement du régime des 
réfugiés et contribuerait à expliquer sa capacité et son 
incapacité à remplir son mandat fondamental de protec-
tion des réfugiés et de mise à disposition de solutions les 
concernant ? Pour répondre à ces questions, cet article puise 
dans la littérature traitant du pouvoir dans la gouvernance 
mondiale afin de proposer un cadre heuristique pour com-
prendre le pouvoir et l’influence dans les divers contextes du 
régime international des réfugiés. Il défend l’idée que des 
formes variées de pouvoir coexistent à l’intérieur du régime, 
et que des travaux de recherche supplémentaires pourraient 
examiner de manière pertinente les manifestations et les 
conséquences de ces formes de pouvoir dans la conception et 
la mise en œuvre de la politique internationale des réfugiés.
Introduction
In the aftermath of the Second World War, states for-malized a global refugee regime.1 This regime was cre-ated to perform two primary functions: to help ensure 
the protection of refugees and to find a solution to their 
plight. More than sixty years later, however, the regime has 
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not predictably fulfilled these two functions. In an effort 
to understand the limitations of the global refugee regime, 
scholarship in the field of refugee studies over the past two 
decades has engaged with issues of politics and power. A 
focus of this work has been to understand the functioning of 
the regime at a global level and the factors that condition the 
ability of the regime to fulfill its core functions across con-
texts.2 There has likewise been a sustained interest in the role 
that politics and interests play in constraining the regime,3 
or, more recently, in expanding the scope and functioning of 
the regime.4 Likewise, a substantial literature has examined 
expressions of power in local contexts, with emphasis on the 
relationships between power, governance, and control, along 
with an understanding of how these expressions of power 
are experienced, resisted, and contested by a range of actors, 
including refugees.5
Indeed, reflections on power in the global refugee regime 
are far from new. Yet while this literature has made signifi-
cant contributions to our understanding of the diverse forms 
of power within the global refugee regime and the conse-
quences of power for the functioning of the regime itself, the 
study of power within the global refugee regime remains 
fragmented, based on conceptualizations of power and the 
context within which power is expressed and experienced. 
In fact, there has been limited sustained dialogue between 
approaches that examine the functioning of power within 
the institutions of the global refugee regime, primarily at 
the global level, and expressions and experiences of power 
in local contexts. Given the central role that power is seen 
to play in the functioning of the regime in various contexts, 
and given that these forms and expressions of power may 
function and be experienced differently in various con-
texts or “scales” of the regime,6 fostering dialogue between 
understandings of power could usefully open new areas of 
enquiry into the functioning of the global refugee regime 
and contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of 
the regime’s ability or inability to fulfill its core mandate of 
protection and solutions for refugees.
To this end, this article asks, What are the forms of 
power present in the global refugee regime? How is power 
expressed and experienced in diverse contexts? How can 
understandings of these diverse expressions of power be 
brought into conversation to encourage a more comprehen-
sive understanding of the role of power in the functioning 
of the regime? In response, this article presents a heuristic 
framework for understanding power in the global refugee 
regime, which is intended to serve both as a common point 
of reference for contributions to this special issue and as a 
basis for future research. It draws from the broader literature 
on power and its functioning in the context of global gov-
ernance to argue that power can be observed in the global 
refugee regime largely in accordance with the taxonomy 
proposed by Barnett and Duvall.7 This taxonomy argues that 
power exists and can be expressed in four forms: compul-
sory, institutional, structural, and productive. In considering 
these four forms of power, it is argued that our understand-
ing of expressions of power needs to include a discussion of 
how power is experienced and the forms of resistance and 
contestation that are present in diverse contexts. On the 
basis of this understanding, the article argues that the func-
tioning of power in the global refugee regime can be usefully 
observed and understood in the day-to-day practice of the 
regime, particularly in the making and implementation of 
global refugee policy.8
Power and the Global Refugee Regime
In the early 1980s, Krasner characterized a regime as “sets 
of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures around which actors’ expectations 
converge in a given area of international relations,” such as 
trade or the environment.9 More recently, Betts has argued 
that regimes, in essence, have “two core elements: norms 
and international organizations.”10 In this way, the study 
of regimes assumes that regimes are created in response to 
the perception of a shared issue or concern, that norms are 
developed to provide a template for common agreed behav-
iour in responding to this shared concern, and that insti-
tutions are developed to facilitate cooperation in this area, 
both through providing a decision-making mechanisms 
where new and unforeseen issues may be addressed and by 
developing expertise and knowledge on how the norms of 
the regime can be upheld and applied in different contexts.
These core elements of a global regime are arguably pre-
sent in what emerged as the “global refugee regime” in the 
aftermath of the Second World War.11 The first element of 
the regime are the norms detailed in the 1951 Convention. 
These norms include a definition of who may benefit from 
refugee status, and the rights and obligations to be afforded 
to such individuals. At the same time, states created UNHCR 
as a specialized UN agency whose mandate is twofold. Article 
1 of UNHCR 1950 Statute details that UNHCR, “acting under the 
authority of the General Assembly, shall assume the function 
of providing international protection … and of seeking per-
manent solutions for the problem of refugees.” Despite signifi-
cant growth in the size of UNHCR and the scope of its activities 
since its inception, these two responsibilities arguably remain 
the core responsibilities of the global refugee regime. 
But why do states create regimes, such as the global refu-
gee regime? While some realist international relations schol-
ars have largely dismissed the impact of regimes,12 others 
have argued that states act through global regimes because it 
helps them “achieve their ends,” either because they are able 
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to determine the terms and outcomes of regimes, or because 
they are able to gain material and other benefits from par-
ticipation.13 Neo-liberal approaches tend to view regimes 
as important opportunities to overcome collective action 
failure and facilitate international cooperation to shared 
problems,14 while constructivist approaches identify the 
potential for regimes, generally, and international organiza-
tions, specifically, to become independent actors in the inter-
national system.15 Others have convincingly challenged early 
assumptions that regimes are “benevolent, voluntary, coop-
erative, and thus legitimate associations,”16 arguing instead 
that regimes are forums of contestation where actors seek 
to influence the functioning of the regime, notwithstanding 
the objectives of the regime and the norms it was supposedly 
created to propagate.
These perspectives are all arguably relevant to the study 
and functioning of the global refugee regime. For example, 
realists might argue that the United States has established 
itself as the hegemon within the global refugee regime, given 
the scale of its financial and other contributions to UNHCR, 
and that it understands this support of—and influence 
within—the regime to be an extension of its interests and 
foreign policy.17 For their part, refugee-hosting states in 
the Global South may be seen as engaging with the regime 
as it serves their ends and ensures that they receive some 
international assistance, however modest, to respond to the 
mass arrival and prolonged presence of refugees on their ter-
ritory. Neo-liberal perspectives, however, would argue that 
the scale of the challenges posed by refugee movements is 
beyond the capacity of any one state to resolve, resulting in 
the collective benefit of a regime to underpin a coordinated 
response. The growth of UNHCR over the past six decades 
also lends credence to constructivist arguments about the 
increasingly autonomous character of international organi-
zations, independent from the intentions of the states that 
created them. Likewise, even a passing consideration of the 
functioning of the regime illustrates how it can very much 
function not as a consensus-building mechanism but as a 
forum of contestation, as argued by critical scholars. 
In addition to highlighting the contestation implicit in 
relations between states and other institutional actors within 
the global refugee regime, critical scholarship also empha-
sizes the importance of including the perspectives of the 
subjects of interventions, and how they experience power, in 
our understanding of the functioning of the global refugee 
regime. Indeed, critical migration and citizenship scholars 
have demonstrated the benefits of using the perspective of 
refugees and migrants as an entry point to interrogate the 
functioning of global regimes, especially when understand-
ing manifestations of power, resistance, and contestation in 
the local context. Unlike power in the global context, which 
tends to be expressed and experienced by states and institu-
tions, manifestations of power in the local context have an 
intimate characteristic, as refugees and interveners are fused 
in an unequal power relationship where decisions and prac-
tices often have immediate and consequential effects on the 
daily lives of refugees. In these contexts, various technolo-
gies of power are employed to control the mobility, behav-
iour, and legal status of refugees. For example, Hyndman 
draws on the experience of the Dadaab refugee camps in 
Kenya to illustrate how coercion and disciplinary practices 
used by the UNHCR sought to control and produce desirable 
behaviour in refugees, which served a de-politicizing func-
tion.18 Despite such attempts to silence and control refugees, 
Nyers and Rygiel argue that spaces of control and confine-
ment are also sites of political action where “mobilisations 
occur, subjectivities are formed, and contestations of the 
regimes governing mobility are enacted.”19 Refugees make 
claims, judgments, and demands on the way in which global 
refugee policies have an impact on their individual situations. 
As Nyers argues, “Refugees are not supposed to be political 
agents … yet everywhere they are demonstrating political 
agency.”20 In this way, a more comprehensive understanding 
of the functioning of the global refugee regime must include 
an account of the diverse actors and forms of power present 
in institutional contexts at the global level, and implementa-
tion contexts at the local level. 
Power and Global Governance
The need to develop more robust understandings of the 
functioning of power and the need to foster conversations 
between diverse perspectives on the various expressions and 
experiences of power is not limited to the study of the global 
refugee regime. In fact, similar challenges have been identi-
fied in understanding the role of power in the functioning 
of other examples of global regimes, institutions, and law—
broadly understood as the study of “global governance.”21 
The most prominent effort to foster such a conversation in 
the field of global governance is the 2005 collection edited 
by Barnett and Duvall, in which they consider the diverse 
manifestations of power in the study and practice of global 
governance. They argue that while power can be understood 
as “the production, in and through social relations, of effects 
that shape the capacities of actors to determine their own cir-
cumstances and fate,” it is equally important to understand 
that “power does not have a single expression or form.”22 
While different traditions within the study of international 
relations have sought to present an exclusive understand-
ing of power, Barnett and Duvall argue that a taxonomy of 
power that incorporates various possible forms of power 
“detaches discussions of power from the limitations of real-
ism, encourages scholars to see power’s multiple forms, and 
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discourages a presumptive dismissal of one form in favor of 
another.”23 In this way, the framework proposed by Barnett 
and Duvall is especially useful to the study of power in the 
global refugee regime, as it provides a context within which 
current understandings of power may be brought into closer 
conversation, while also providing a basis for future inves-
tigation not tied to a particular conceptualization of power. 
Barnett and Duvall argue that there are four types of power 
present in global governance. The first is compulsory power. 
This form of power involves the exercise of direct control of 
one actor over another and the ability of actors “to use mate-
rial resources to advance its interest in direct opposition to the 
interests of another.”24 While this form of power is most typi-
cally associated with the use of physical and economic power 
by states to compel other states to act in certain ways, they 
argue that some non-state actors may also exercise this type of 
power, even over states. Despite the role of non-interference 
in the international system, transnational corporations and 
international financial institutions have been found to exer-
cise what amounts to compulsory power in their interactions 
with weaker and more marginalized states.25
This form of power has been present throughout the his-
tory of the global refugee regime. Most directly, it has been 
present in the ability of donor states to control the activities 
of UNHCR as a result of the organization’s reliance on volun-
tary contributions. As detailed in Paragraph 20 of UNHCR’s 
Statute, the organization would receive financial support 
from the UN budget to cover only administrative expenses, 
and “all other expenditures relating to the activities of the 
High Commissioner shall be financed by voluntary contribu-
tions.” Through this provision, “UNHCR was made financially 
dependent on donor governments,” which “continues to be 
among the most significant means through which states are 
able to control the scope of UNHCR’s work.”26 Today, this 
means that roughly 98 per cent of UNHCR’s funding comes 
from voluntary contributions, primarily from a limited 
number of states in the Global North. Many of these states 
enhance the compulsory nature of their support to UNHCR 
by “earmarking” their contribution, thereby limiting where 
and how those funds may be used. For example, the United 
States has consistently remained the largest donor to UNHCR, 
typically accounting for a third of all state contributions to 
UNHCR, 100 per cent of which are earmarked. 
Host states may also be understood to possess forms of 
compulsory power within the global refugee regime. Given 
the principle of sovereignty within the international system, 
and the limited enforcement mechanisms for the norms 
detailed in the 1951 Convention, states have ultimate control 
over their borders and the quantity and quality of asylum 
they afford to refugees.27 Since the 1980s, the shifting inter-
ests of states in the Global South have contributed to states 
either restricting the number of refugees on their territory 
or limiting the rights of those refugees who are allowed to 
remain. While donors and UNHCR may seek to mitigate these 
responses through financial and diplomatic tools, the forced 
return of refugees from Bangladesh and Tanzania in the 
late 1990s illustrate how the restrictive policies of host states 
may ultimately be implemented through the use of com-
pulsory power. This form of power is, however, frequently 
constrained by the imbalance of power between many host 
states in the Global South and donor states in the Global 
North, suggesting that the interaction between the forms of 
power presented by Barnett and Duvall needs to be more 
critically interrogated. 
The second type of power is institutional power. This is a 
more diffuse form of power, primarily whereby states design 
international institutions to their benefit, and these institu-
tions, in turn, come to affect the behaviour of others. This 
claim revolves around the understanding that more power-
ful states in the international system have the ability to shape 
the scope and mandates of new international organizations 
and regimes, and that these institutions then affect the 
behaviour of other actors. However, as argued by Hurrell 
and Barnett and Finnemore,28 this is arguably a less predict-
able form of power, as institutions may not always behave in 
the way intended by their founders. Indeed, Hurrell notes 
that traditionally weaker states in the international system 
are “increasingly ‘rule-takers’ over a whole range of issues 
that affect all aspects of social, economic and political life,”29 
especially following their new-found majority in the United 
Nations General Assembly following decolonization in the 
1960s. 
Institutional power has also been evident throughout 
the history of the global refugee regime. As detailed by 
Loescher,30 states participating in negotiations leading to 
the creation of UNHCR had starkly contrasting views of the 
scope and functions of the new organization. Specifically, 
the United States “sought a temporary refugee agency with 
narrow authority and limited functions.” In contrast, West-
ern European states “were anxious to secure large-scale 
operational funds for the refugees they were supporting,” 
while a number of non-European states, including India and 
Pakistan, “argued that UNHCR should be a strong, permanent 
organization.” Ultimately, the US position prevailed, and 
UNHCR was established as a temporary organization with a 
non-political and geographically limited mandate, and a reli-
ance on voluntary funds. Over the past sixty years, however, 
UNHCR has demonstrated its own ability to exercise institu-
tional power and transform itself into a global organization 
with an ever-increasing mandate. 
Indeed, this form of power remains central to under-
standings of the global refugee regime as the scope of 
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UNHCR’s mandate continues to evolve. For example, recent 
discussions on institutional responsibility for “survival 
migration” and “crisis migration” illustrate the enduring 
significance of institutional power,31 the range of actors that 
seek to demonstrate this form of power in the shaping and 
reshaping of the regime, the need to more fully understand 
the forms institutional power may take, and if, and how, the 
ability to demonstrate this form of power is contingent on 
other forms of power. Likewise, institutional power contrib-
utes to our understanding of the proliferation of regimes 
that often overlap with the global refugee regime and how 
states may engage in “forum-shopping” to select the regime 
within which “they are best able to promote specific policy 
preferences.”32 
The third type of power, structural power, is a more dif-
fuse form of power deriving from the “direct and mutual 
constitution of the capacities of actors” and the “determina-
tion of social capacities and interests.”33 While this can be 
understood in terms of economic capabilities and relation 
to the means of production, as a classical Marxist analysis 
would suggest, or the role of global capitalism in determin-
ing the capacities and resources of actors, as Gramscians 
would argue, this form of power may more generally be 
understood in terms of centrality or marginalization within 
the structure of the international system.34 In this way, the 
ability for a given state to act in a particular way may be 
conditioned or constrained by structural factors determin-
ing its place within the international system. Krasner argues 
that these structural factors result in a “deep asymmetry 
of power” between states in the Global North and Global 
South that “leaves almost all developing countries exposed 
to shocks from the international environment.”35 
Structural power has arguably played both a specific and 
a more diffuse role in conditioning the behaviour of actors 
within the global refugee regime. Specifically, structural 
power often constrains the willingness or ability of refugee-
hosting states to exercise their compulsory power, as outlined 
above. In the case of prominent refugee-hosting states in 
Africa, for example, it has been argued that “it is not possible 
for aid-dependent states to approach the question of refugees 
without consideration of foreign policy implications” and that 
such states “do not feel free to pursue unilateral action for fear 
of jeopardizing relations with the donor community, upon 
whom they are dependent.”36 Structural inequalities also con-
strain the ability of many states to demonstrate institutional 
power. In many instances, states are constrained in their 
ability to individually influence the shaping and evolution of 
international institutions, either as a result of their position 
on the periphery of the international system or of the dispar-
ity in resources of different permanent missions to the United 
Nations in New York and Geneva. For example, when both 
the United States and Tanzania were members of the UN Secu-
rity Council in 2006, Tanzania had 15 staff in its permanent 
mission in New York, while the United States had 127, in addi-
tion to roughly as many administrative support staff. 
More generally, structural power helps explain the wider 
significance of the “North-South impasse” in the global 
refugee regime and points to the need to more fully engage 
with the political economy of the regime itself and the wider 
political and economic context within which the regime 
functions. For example, the ability of Australia to convince 
neighbouring small island states to support extraterritorial 
processing can be explained largely by the asymmetries of 
structural power between states in the region.37 Further 
research could usefully develop our understanding of the 
manifestations of this form of power by state and non-state 
actors within the regime and its implications for the func-
tioning of the regime more generally.
The fourth type of power is productive power, defined as 
the “production of subjects through diffuse social relations.”38 
This type of power relates to the production of subjectivities 
and the relationship between power and knowledge. At the 
core of this form of power is the ability of actors to create 
and enforce new realities through the use of knowledge, dis-
course, and claims to legitimacy. As outlined by Keeley, this 
form of power relates to the ability of actors to support “a 
dominating discourse” and “to extend or at least to defend 
its grasp through the conversion of others and suppression 
of rival knowledges.”39 More generally, this form of power 
relates to the ability to create and enforce categories and 
labels. The refugee studies literature over the past twenty-
five years clearly illustrates how this is a significant form of 
power within the global refugee regime.40 
It is here, however, that the specificity of the global refugee 
regime needs to be highlighted when considering the appli-
cation of Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy. Unlike other areas 
of global governance, where the objects of categories and 
labels cannot resist or contest expressions of power, there is 
growing recognition of the fact that refugees are agents that 
can, and do, resist expressions of power. While some, like 
Bariagber,41 argue that refugees have limited ability to resist 
the interests of more powerful actors such as states and inter-
national organizations, others, such as Holzer,42 illustrate 
how refugees organize to resist and contest the imposition 
of policies by states and other actors. It is for this reason that 
understandings of power in the context of the global refugee 
regime need to include considerations of resistance. 
Indeed, as noted by Barnett and Duvall, individuals 
may resist power and “seek greater capacity to influence 
the social forces that define them and their parameters of 
action.”43 Like power, there are various conceptualizations 
of resistance, and the form that it takes depends on the type 
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of power it is confronting. For example, Barnett and Duvall 
argue that resistance to structural power involves actors who 
are in subordinate structural position attempting to reduce 
the inequality that is inherent in a hierarchical relationship 
by trying to change the structure that sustains it. Such forms 
of resistance are arguably found in examples of refugees stag-
ing protests and sit-ins in order to resist their subordinate 
structural positioning.44 In contrast, Scott argues that the 
resistance of those in subordinate positions can take the 
form of more atomized expressions, which he calls “everyday 
forms of resistance.”45 This includes “foot-dragging, evasion, 
false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander and 
sabotage.”46 Although resistance can be a visible collective 
struggle, it can also take a more subtle form through indi-
vidual creative action. 
Likewise, Barnett and Duvall argue that resistance to 
productive power involves attempts by actors to “destabi-
lize, even remake, their subjectivities and to transform or 
disrupt the broader practices through which subjectivities 
are produced, normalized and naturalized.”47 Resistance to 
productive power involves remaking or reclaiming identities. 
For example, Nyers utilizes the concept of “refugee warriors” 
to demonstrate how refugees contest the categorization of 
their identities as passive, victim-like, non-violent, and com-
pliant.48 This taking of political subjectivity by the refugee 
subverts the binary of the speaking, visible citizen and the 
invisible and victim-like refugee.49 
These brief considerations of resistance illustrate the 
wide range of actors implicated in the study of power in 
the global refugee regime. In recognizing that states are not 
the only actors to express power, and that state power may 
be resisted and contested by other actors such as refugees, 
the framework proposed by Barnett and Duvall also allows 
for our understanding of “the centrality of sovereignty and 
the powerful role of states” to be balanced with a recogni-
tion that “power is not confined to states.”50 Indeed, this 
approach encourages an understanding that power “works 
and is expressed in various ways that cannot be captured by a 
single and simple formulation under the control of states.”51 
Likewise, while the taxonomy proposed by Barnett and 
Duvall provides a framework through which diverse forms 
of power may be placed in conversation, it also highlights 
how power is expressed and experienced in global contexts, 
such as in the formal decision-making structures of the 
global refugee regime, and in local contexts, where efforts 
are made to implement those decisions. Such an approach 
also allows for a more nuanced understanding of the func-
tioning of power in both the global and local manifestations 
of the refugee regime. For example, Betts provides a compel-
ling account of efforts to align the interests of states in the 
Global North and Global South during four specific global 
negotiation processes: the International Conference on 
Assistance to Refugees in Africa (1981 and 1984); the Inter-
national Conference on Central American Refugees (1987 
to 1995); the Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese 
Refugees (1988 to 1996); and the Convention Plus Initiative 
(2003 to 2005).52 In each case, Betts notes that UNHCR was 
faced with the task of “trying to persuade Northern states 
to voluntarily contribute to supporting refugee protection 
Southern states” and that it was successful in this task when 
it was able to “influence the beliefs of Northern states about 
the causal relationship between refugee protection in the 
South and their wider interests,” especially relating to secu-
rity.53 While he highlights how UNHCR’s success in some of 
these efforts and not others “identifies the role of substantive 
linkages as a neglected resource for power,”54 his later study 
on efforts to stretch the application of the global refugee 
regime in six local contexts found that UNHCR was largely 
“epiphenomenal” in the process.55
How can such variation in the role of UNHCR and its abil-
ity to demonstrate power be explained? Part of the answer 
may lie in the changing historical context of the case stud-
ies,56 although the Convention Plus initiative overlaps with 
the six cases Betts explored in 2013. More generally, however, 
this variation likely highlights the need to study the role of 
actors and their efforts to exert power in various contexts, 
both during negotiations within the global refugee regime 
and during efforts to implement the decisions of the regime. 
This points to the potential difference between the forms and 
functioning of power that may exist within the regime, such 
as in Geneva where decision-making is more formalized 
and access to decision-making more institutionalized, and 
outside the regime, in local contexts where the day-to-day 
implementation of decisions involves interactions across 
diverse contexts and a wide possibility of actors who are 
outside the regime. 57 
Understanding Power in the Global Refugee Regime
The challenge remains to identify a process within the global 
refugee regime that transcends negotiations in Geneva and 
implementation efforts in local contexts through which the 
various forms of power within the global refugee regime may 
be observed, and for this to be recurring, thereby allowing 
for a consideration of the changing experience of power over 
time. One such opportunity may be found in the process 
by which global refugee policy is made and the factors that 
determine its implementation and non-implementation. 
Global refugee policy has recently been defined as a formal 
statement of, and proposed course of action in response 
to, a problem relating to protection, solutions or assistance 
for refugees or other populations of concern to the global 
refugee regime. It is discussed and approved within UNHCR’s 
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governing structures, such as the Executive Committee and 
Standing Committee, or the United Nations General Assem-
bly, which arguably constitute the decision-making bodies 
of the global refugee regime. Borrowing from the work of 
Soroos, this policy is “global” when it takes the form of “either 
regulations that define the limits of permissible behavior for 
national governments,” including through international law 
or ExCom Conclusions, or “as programs administered by 
international agencies,” specifically UNHCR.58 
In recent years, considerable time and resources have 
been invested in efforts to develop, adopt, and implement 
global policies on issues as diverse as refugees in urban areas, 
displacement resulting from natural disasters, refugees with 
disabilities, and resolution of protracted refugee situations. 
In this way, the making and implementation of global refu-
gee policy constitutes a core and recurring activity of the 
global refugee regime.
Despite the scope of these policies, there has been very 
limited understanding of the process through which par-
ticular issues or problems compete for prominence on the 
agenda of the global refugee regime’s decision-making bod-
ies, where the interests of different actors affect decisions on 
responses to these issues, and where a range of factors condi-
tion efforts to implement these decisions in diverse contexts. 
How do actors compete to raise issues on the agenda of the 
global refugee regime? Does the support of certain actors 
matter more than others? What factors condition variation 
in the implementation of global policies in diverse national 
and local contexts? How are efforts to implement global poli-
cies resisted or contested in local contexts? Are there par-
ticular forms of power that are more significant at different 
stages of the process? What is the consequence of competing 
forms of power?
These questions may serve as opportunities to consider the 
extent to which Barnett and Duvall’s framework helps explain 
the behaviour of actors and their ability to demonstrate, or be 
affected by, power. At the same time, this framework allows 
for more comparability of different policy processes over 
time and efforts to implement the same policies in differ-
ent contexts. In very simple terms, such an approach allows 
for a mapping of power and influence by actors at different 
stages in the policy process. Future studies may examine the 
relative exercise of power by actors in the process by which a 
particular policy is made at the Geneva level and the process 
by which it is implemented, or not implemented, in regional, 
national, and local contexts.59 Such an approach also high-
lights the contrast between the structures that condition the 
functioning of power at the global and local levels through a 
distinction between the making and implementation of policy.
Expressions of power play an important role in condition-
ing the “making” of global refugee policy, especially within 
the formal decision-making structures of the global refugee 
regime, such as UNHCR’s Executive Committee (ExCom). As 
argued by Fresia,60 a limited number of state and institu-
tional actors can exert particular influence over this process 
by determining which issues are placed on ExCom’s agenda, 
in deliberating options, and in formally adopting policy. 
Specifically, she argues that the process of contestation and 
decision-making on the text of a given ExCom Conclusion 
not only precedes the vote by ExCom member states, but fre-
quently occurs in sessions to which only states and UNHCR 
are invited and in which the power of individual state actors 
are especially manifest. Indeed, given the highly institution-
alized nature of the making of global refugee policy, only a 
limited number of actors, namely states belonging to ExCom 
and UNHCR, participate in this process. Other actors, includ-
ing NGOs and refugees, are not able to participate directly 
in the formal and informal process leading to decisions of 
UNHCR’s Executive Committee. 
An exception may be the role of epistemic communities, 
defined by Howlett and Giest as “loose groupings of experts 
or knowledge providers” that have the opportunity to influ-
ence the policy process by proposing “policy alternatives.”61 
For example, several academics were invited to contribute to 
the Global Consultations process, leading to the 2002 Agenda 
for Protection, especially through “Expert Roundtables” in 
2001 on issues ranging from exclusion and cessation, non-
refoulement, and gender-related persecution, to family unity. 
The influence of such actors, however, may be understood as 
indirect at best, as their positions must be brought into the 
formal decision-making process either by a state or by UNHCR. 
More contested, however, is the “policy implementation 
stage” where “global refugee policy leaves the global level 
and intersects with dynamics at the regional, national and 
local levels.”62 As global refugee policy is implemented, 
local dynamics intersect, influence, and shape what a policy 
actually achieves in practice. This is where a gap emerges 
between the global prescribed intent of the policy and the 
change it actually makes in the lives of refugees.63 In the 
example of urban refugees in South Africa, Landau and 
Amit illustrate the role of wider domestic policy spheres in 
creating protection gaps such as poverty alleviation, hous-
ing, public health, and development.64 Milner describes 
how efforts to implement a global policy on solutions for 
protracted refugee situations in Tanzania were constrained 
by changes in the domestic context of Tanzanian politics.65 
Likewise, Wojnarowicz’s case study of the town of Gioiosa-
Ionica, Italy, highlights how local organizations who have 
been outsourced to implement protection hold discretionary 
authority to develop new practices that contest protection 
and condition its provision on the acquiescence of refu-
gees.66 As such, global refugee policy rarely reaches the local 
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context uncompromised, as a wide range of policy spheres 
and local actors inside and outside the global refugee regime 
shape the outcomes for refugees and other forced migrants. 
Unlike the global context of the global refugee regime 
where the actors, decision-making procedures, and insti-
tutions remains relatively formalized and stable, the local 
context is the “wild card” of implementation, varying across 
geographies and contexts. It is because of this high degree 
of local differentiation that studying micro-level dynamics 
remains important to unpacking how the same policy has 
different and often poor impacts in the lives of refugees 
across contexts. 
The actors involved in implementation of global refu-
gee policy consist of a multiplicity of voices that are more 
diverse and varied than in global institutional contexts. 
For their part, Betts and Orchard outline a wide range of 
domestic actors implicated in implementation, including 
formally sanctioned actors such as governments, the UNHCR, 
and implementing partners, but also a wide variety of non-
state actors such as INGOs, transnational civil society, and 
rebel groups.67 In addition, more micro-level actors such 
as municipalities, businesses, Mafia groups, local popula-
tions, and entire local communities can serve as gatekeepers 
enabling or constraining what global refugee policies do in 
practice. Within these actor groups the “personality, values 
and talents” of individuals also matter, as individuals have 
significant agency and discretionary authority to influence 
and shape how policies are practised, withstanding struc-
tural constraints.68 Crucially, although refugees are excluded 
from the contentions and confrontations in the creation of 
global refugee policy, they exert agency and make claims on 
the types of policies that are created in the global institu-
tional context; how these policies are implemented by states 
and implementers in the local contexts; and the extent to 
which these policies alleviate their plight. 
All four forms of power highlighted in Barnett and Duval’s 
framework can be observed in the everyday implementation 
of global refugee policies. What is particular about the mani-
festations of power in the local context is that their forms 
and expressions are much more acute as refugees experience 
power directly in personal and intimate ways. Refugees are 
not mere abstract subjects but are embodied subjects who 
are co-constituted in intimate relationships with their sur-
roundings. Structural and productive power are arguably 
the most empirically visible forms of power in the local 
context, as both work through “social relations of constitu-
tion.”69 Structural power works through the direct hierarchi-
cal relation of constitution, which can be observed in the 
refugee–implementer relationship, and productive power 
is concerned with the making, creating, and reaffirming of 
subjectivities. 
Yet power is always accompanied by a certain element 
of resistance. Refugees assert themselves as political actors, 
through tactics that range from concerted action to more 
atomized expressions. The proliferation of dramatic acts of 
self-harm such as public hunger strikes and self-suturing 
are well documented, as well as the collective use of protest. 
Nyers and Moulin illustrate how Sudanese refugees in Cairo 
constituted themselves as a political collective and challenged 
UNHCR’s authority and decision-making on refugee status 
determination decisions and resettlement procedures.70 
Furthermore, Coffie describes how a six-month protest by 
Liberian refugees in Ghana led to intended and unintended 
changes in practice, such as the expansion of the timelines 
for repatriation, the introduction of cash allowances, and 
instances of refoulement.71 In addition to grandiose acts, 
refugees utilize more mundane and everyday expressions 
of resistance such as invisibility and bypassing the refugee 
regime altogether, which are less dramatic but nonetheless 
represent a rejection of how power is experienced in their 
daily life. 
As such, expanding our understanding of power in the 
global refugee regime to include the confluence of power 
in global and local contexts must account for the different 
actors involved at either scale, the most prominent forms, 
expressions, and experiences of power for these actors, and 
the strategies utilized to resist this power during the making 
and implementation of policy. But more than that, we must 
begin to trace linkages between global decision-making 
procedures and local implementation. How are global refu-
gee policies experienced in the lives of refugees? How does 
power constrain the ability of refugees to participate in the 
decision-making and implementation of policies that are 
created to alleviate their plight? And finally, how can power 
be used to subvert dominant modes of operating to create 
new inclusive, innovative, and participatory experiences of 
protection and solutions to displacement? 
Conclusion
The objective of this article has been to present a heuristic 
framework for understanding the forms of power within 
the global refugee regime. Drawing from the framework 
of power in global governance presented by Barnett and 
Duvall, this article has argued that at least four forms may 
be observed in the global refugee regime: compulsory, insti-
tutional, structural, and productive. While all four forms of 
power are present in the functioning of the global refugee 
regime, the article argues that the human-centred nature of 
the regime requires our analysis to consider both the expres-
sion and experience of power, and to more fully understand 
the ways in which expressions of power may be resisted 
or contested. To facilitate a more comprehensive study of 
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expressions and experiences of power across contexts, the 
article then argued that the functioning of power and influ-
ence in the global refugee regime can usefully be observed 
and understood in the day-to-day practice of the regime, 
including in the process by which actors engage with the 
making and implementation of global refugee policy. 
While attempting to present a heuristic framework for 
future research on the experience of power in the global 
refugee regime, and as a foundation for the articles in this 
special issue, this article should be understood as part of an 
effort to start a longer and broader conversation. Much more 
work is needed on the range of questions that are provoked 
by a deeper consideration of expressions and experiences of 
power across the global refugee regime. What are the foun-
dations of power? How do expressions and experiences of 
power in the various contexts of the regime interact? What 
role do authority and legitimacy play in the perception of 
forms of power? Is there a hierarchy of power? And can we 
differentiate between the conscious and unconscious use of 
power? When actors use power, is it always intentional?
Given the complexity of power, its diverse manifestations, 
and its ability to be present in all social relations, this article 
does not claim to present a comprehensive or definitive treat-
ment of power in the global refugee regime. Indeed, it makes 
only passing reference to the many voices that are excluded 
from power and marginalized from the process by which 
policy is made and implemented. What this article does 
argue, however, is that power is a more central and complex 
phenomenon in the study and practice of the global refugee 
regime than we may have previously recognized, and that 
a more systematic, collaborative, and inclusive conversation 
on power should be encouraged. Given the current state of 
the global refugee regime, and daily examples of its short-
comings, there is no better time to start this conversation.
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